> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://aspex.mintlify.site/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Quickstart

> Install, see what your agents did, scan what they could do. About a minute.

<Steps>
  <Step title="Install">
    <CodeGroup>
      ```bash Homebrew theme={"dark"}
      brew install aspex-security/tap/aspex
      ```

      ```bash npm theme={"dark"}
      npx aspex              # run without installing
      npm install -g aspex   # or put it on PATH
      ```

      ```bash curl theme={"dark"}
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aspex-security/aspex/main/install.sh | sh
      ```

      ```bash Binary theme={"dark"}
      # macOS, Linux, Windows: https://github.com/aspex-security/aspex/releases
      ```
    </CodeGroup>

    One Go binary. Every release ships SHA-256 checksums.
  </Step>

  <Step title="See the whole picture">
    Run `aspex` with no arguments. It joins your MCP configs with your clients' own logs.

    ```
    $ aspex

      ▸ In the last 30 days your agents made 333 tool calls to 12 MCP servers.
      ▸ 329 of those calls went to 11 servers no security scan had ever checked.
      ▸ 1 call tripped a detection rule. Most common: cross-server data chain (1).
      ▸ 7 configured servers, overall security score 39/100. […]
    ```

    Then a menu opens underneath. `aspex share` prints the same headlines with no names or paths.
  </Step>

  <Step title="Scan what your agents could do">
    ```
    $ aspex scan

      ╭─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╮
      │   18 / 100  ████░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░░  HIGH RISK (100 = safe)  │
      │  7 servers · 99 tools · 34 findings · 7s elapsed           │
      │  5 critical  17 high  12 medium                               │
      │  ↓ -21 pts since last scan (was 39/100)                     │
      ╰─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯

      Blast radius HIGH  ✓ reads credentials or sensitive files · ✓ arbitrary external network egress · ✓ command execution · ✓ can rewrite agent config or hooks that run at next start · ✓ can rewrite agent instructions or memory · ✓ external content enters the agent's context

      CRITICAL  AP001  Potential sensitive data exfiltration path  confidence: high
         filesystem
           └─ read_file: reads files by path
           └─ read_text_file: reads files by path
           └─ read_media_file: reads files by path
           └─ read_multiple_files: reads files by path
           └─ allowed root /Users/steven (home directory: includes ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, browser profiles)
           └─ and 5 more items (see --json)
         playwright
           └─ browser_navigate: reaches network destinations (takes a URL parameter)
           └─ browser_navigate_back: reaches network destinations
           └─ browser_network_request: reaches network destinations
           └─ browser_tabs: reaches network destinations (takes a URL parameter)
           └─ and 1 more item (see --json)
      […]
    ```

    Every finding carries evidence, a hop-by-hop path and a fix. [aspex scan →](/tools/scan)
  </Step>

  <Step title="Ask it a question">
    ```
    $ aspex explain "Can this agent exfiltrate SSH keys?"

      YES  plausible path exists

      A potential exfiltration path exists: filesystem reads credentials (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, keychains), playwright can send it to any network destination.

         credentials (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, keychains)
           ↓
         filesystem (read, inferred)
           ↓
         agent context
           ↓
         playwright (network, inferred)
           ↓
         any network destination

      Required conditions
         ✓ external content enters the agent's context
           via brave-search, github, playwright; also any pasted document or prompt
         ✓ a server can read credentials (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, keychains)
           filesystem (read, inferred): reads credential files such as ~/.ssh and ~/.aws (root /Users/steven)
         ✓ a server can send data off this machine
           playwright (network, inferred) reaches any network destination

      Not proven
         ✗ no runtime evidence that credentials (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, keychains) was transmitted; payloads are not in the logs
         ✗ whether an instruction to do so ever reached the agent

      Confidence: MEDIUM
    ```

    Computed from the graph, never generated. A YES never claims anything happened. [aspex explain →](/tools/explain)
  </Step>

  <Step title="Lock it">
    ```sh theme={"dark"}
    aspex lock          # write .aspex.lock, commit it
    aspex verify        # exit 1 on drift: NEW TOOL, DESCRIPTION CHANGED, SCOPE EXPANDED, NEW ATTACK PATH
    ```

    Next:

    * [**Understand a finding**](/tools/explain) with `aspex explain AP001`, and follow the data with `aspex explain "Where could data from ~/.ssh go?"`.
    * [**Investigate what happened**](/tools/trace) with `aspex trace`, then [`aspex explore`](/tools/explore).
    * [**Add Aspex to CI**](/guides/ci-integration) to gate PRs on new attack paths.
    * [**Browse common workflows**](/guides/common-workflows): task first, command second.
  </Step>
</Steps>